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TASK: Prepare for Ground-Emplaced Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Operations Prior to Movement (UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO) (05-1-1006)
(FMI 3-34.119) (EQT) (FM 3-34)
(FM 34-2-1)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 M (Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle)

CONDITIONS: The element is preparing to conduct movement operations in a designated area of responsibility (AOR). The element plans to employ all of the fundamentals of assured mobility to defeat any potential IED prior to movement. The unit has rules of engagement (ROE), **Escalation of Force (EOF) measures**, higher headquarters (HQ) mission instructions and a 9-line explosive hazards spot report. Civilians, government and nongovernment organizations, private voluntary organizations, and the international press may be present on the battlefield. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP4.

TASK STANDARDS: The element prepares for ground-emplaced IED defeat operations prior to movement using all of the fundamentals of assured mobility according to Field Manual (FM) 3-34. The element complies with ROE, ROI, higher HQ mission instructions, and other special orders. The time required to perform this task is increased when conducting it in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4.

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| 1. The element prepares for the IED defeat using the fundamentals of assured mobility (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Predicted actions and circumstances that could affect the ability of the force to maintain movement. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Obtained the most recent copy of the IED pattern analysis from the intelligence staff officer (S-2) for the route of movement. (2) Reviewed available geospatial products (for example, TerraBase®, FalconView™, satellite imagery, the Digital Topographic Support System [DTSS], and unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) to assist in conducting a technical reconnaissance. (3) Obtained the most recent information about the route of movement from the Tactical Minefield Database (TMFDB) System, the EH coordination center (EHCC), or similar systems and organizations. (4) Determined vulnerable points or locations along the route of movement. (5) Identified possible primary and alternate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) landing zones/pick-up zones (LZ/PZ) along the route. (6) Obtained the latest intelligence gathered from local police or host nation military joint patrols prior to any movement. (7) Reviewed current known enemy IED capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) patterns, and likely attack locations. (8) Exploited available human intelligence assets to determine possible IED locations and/or local population attitude toward friendly forces. (9) Reviewed after-action reviews (AARs), TTPs, EH spot reports, and ROE for IEDs. (10) Ensured that all communications equipment functioned properly. (11) Developed primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communications plans. (12) Ensured that all members of the element had an EH spot report and were trained in reporting procedures. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| <p>b. Detected early indicators of impediments to battlefield mobility and identified solutions through the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Focused on route reconnaissance. (2) Maintained observation on key terrain or likely ambush locations. (3) Ensured that all personnel received theater-specific, IED-indicator lane training. (4) Employed all available detection assets (for example, UAVs, hunter-killer teams, binoculars, night vision devices, and thermal devices). (5) Maintained consistency and familiarity of the area or route by assigning the same unit to conduct reconnaissance on a regular basis. <p>NOTE: Assigning the same unit to conduct the reconnaissance is preferred; however, units must ensure that they have additional teams familiar with the route for the flexibility of operations. Units that constantly recon the same route become familiar with its individual characteristics and are more likely to spot things that are new, changed, or different. This mitigates combat risk. Leaders must ensure complacency does not set in.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (6) Obtained the most recent priority intelligence requirements (PIR) supporting the decision points relevant to the unit movement. (7) Obtained the most recent PIR supporting the named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) relevant to the unit movement. (8) Coordinated to have detection assets that were relevant to the NAIs. <p>c. Prevented potential impediments to maneuver from affecting the battlefield mobility of the force by acting early.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Coordinated with civil-military operations (CMO) to develop a good relationship and a means of communication with the local community, so that community members felt comfortable providing information. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Advertised telephone numbers to report enemy activity. (b) Offered incentives and consistently assured anonymity. (2) Used patrols, observation points, and checkpoints to interdict and disrupt enemy activities to deny access to the key terrain for IED emplacement. (3) Employed counter-IED ambush teams and sniper teams. (4) Coordinated the clearing of items from routes and roadsides, such as trash, brush, vegetation, and abandoned vehicles. <p>d. Avoided detected impediments to battlefield mobility if prevention failed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Maintained an accurate route status. (2) Disseminated a common operating picture and route status to all units. (3) Planned to avoid high risk areas identified during the pattern analysis. (4) Scheduled movement operations and patrols to avoid predictability. (5) Obtained electronic jammer(s) and ensured proper operation and placement of each piece of equipment. <p>e. Neutralized, reduced, or overcame impediments to battlefield mobility that could not be prevented or avoided.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Integrated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support into the movement plan. (2) Identified a dedicated security element for EOD support during neutralization operations. (3) Ensured that personnel properly reported information within the EH spot report. <p>f. Protected against enemy countermobility efforts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Coordinated for adequate medical support. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | | GO | NO-GO |
|--|--|----|-------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (2) Instructed personnel where to drive or walk on the route (for example, right side, left side, or middle of the route). (3) Directed gunners to maintain low-profile defilade, IAW current Command guidance, at all times. (4) Directed the unit to maintain 360° security at all times. (5) Briefed leaders to ensure that all personnel had all protective gear present (such as eye protection, body armor, or Kevlar® helmets) and properly worn during movement. (6) Directed that all vehicle doors remained locked, with ballistic windows up (if equipped) and nonballistic windows down (to avoid blast damage from breaking glass). (7) Instructed personnel to maintain proper spacing during movement. (8) Coordinated for close air support (CAS) and/or artillery support, quick reaction force (QRF) support, and MEDEVAC support, if available. (9) Instructed that all vehicles had unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and call-for-fire/MEDEVAC/CAS procedures. (10) Ensured that all vehicles were properly hardened or armor-plated to reduce the effects of small arms fire or an IED detonation. (11) Mounted warning signs on vehicles to inform the local nationals to remain 100 meters away from convoys or the use of deadly force was authorized in accordance with the current ROE and escalation of force (EOF). (12) Rehearsed/planned react to IED procedures and EOF drills. (13) Rehearsed contingency and emergency plans. <p>2. The element disseminates the information to subordinate units for execution as required.</p> <p>3. The element conducts a detailed brief and AAR upon completion of operations.</p> | | | |

| TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| ITERATION | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | M | TOTAL |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO" | | | | | | | |
| TRAINING STATUS "GO"/"NO-GO" | | | | | | | |

“(★)” indicates a leader task step.

TASK: React to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Vehicle Borne IED, Suicide VBIED or Person Borne IED (UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO) (05-2-3091)
(FMI 3-34.119) (FM 20-32) (GTA 09-12-001)
(TC 20-32-5)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 M (Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle)

CONDITIONS: The element is conducting movement operations on a designated route. All organic tools, equipment, and materials; Rules of Engagement (ROE); current theater Escalation of Force (EOF) measures; 9-line Explosive Hazards (EH) spot report, and higher headquarters (HQ) mission instructions are available. The element has already received a theater-level IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO) briefing. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP4.

TASK STANDARDS: The element reacts to a possible IED, VBIED, SVBIED or PBIED by using the 5-Cs (confirm, clear, cordon, check, and control). The element complies with ROE and EOF measures, higher HQ mission instructions, and other special orders. The element takes the necessary actions to minimize injuries or fatalities. The time required to perform this task is increased when conducting it in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4.

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| <p>* 1. The element leader briefs the unit on known theater-specific IED threats.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Briefed current IED/VBIED/SVBIED or PBIED types/trends. b. Briefed known enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), patterns, and likely locations of IED placement. c. Briefed locations of previous IED attacks or placement. d. Briefed current known or suspected IED indicators, such as out of place objects, unusual activity or abnormal civilian behavior, fresh concrete patches, news crew or cameramen who were in the area for no apparent reason, or hastily erected new signs. e. Briefed the latest intelligence on the current route of march (primary and alternates). f. Conducted communications checks and reviewed reporting procedures. g. Reviewed EH spot report preparation and reporting procedures. h. Briefed the 3D concept of Distance, Direction, and Description when identifying possible IEDs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Distance away from element in meters. (2) Direction from the element as in North, South, East, West or a clock direction such as "1 O'Clock". (3) Description of the suspected IED being as brief as possible. <p>2. Briefed the 5C's and definitions (Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Check, and Control).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The element "confirms" the requirement for EOD to clear the suspected IED by scanning the immediate surroundings from a 360-degree perspective if possible, using optics, while staying as far back as possible. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Alert the vehicle commander and elements of the convoy of the possible IED/VBIED and its location using the 3 Ds (distance, direction, description). | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|---|----|-------|
| <p>(2) If stopping the vehicle puts it within the estimated casualty radius of the possible IED/VBIED, the driver should speed up and quickly move through the danger area to a tactically safe position and distance (the minimum safe distance is dependent on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC] factors).</p> <p>WARNING: BASE ALL ACTIONS ON CURRENT ENEMY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP) IN THE RESPECTIVE AREA OF OPERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AN AREA WHERE VICTIM-OPERATED IEDS ARE USED, YOU WOULD STOP YOUR VEHICLE.</p> <p>(3) If it is possible to stop the vehicle before getting within the estimated casualty radius of the IED/VBIED, the driver should be prepared to immediately back away from the possible IED/VBIED and place the vehicle in a tactically safe position and distance or as leadership directs (the minimum safe distance is dependent on METT-TC factors).</p> <p>(4) Establish security, and scan for possible secondary IEDs/VBIEDs using the 5/25 meter checks.</p> <p>(5) Report the possible static IED/VBIED and any secondary suspected IEDs/VBIEDs to the patrol leadership using the EH spot report.</p> <p>(6) Immediately scan the area for signs of enemy activity (such as an impending ambush, a triggerman, a cameraman, or a sniper). IEDs/VBIEDs are often used to initiate complex attacks.</p> <p>(7) Follow the vehicle commander's directions, and do not use radio communications equipment within 300 meters of the suspected IED/VBIED.</p> <p>(8) The element calls higher HQ using the 9 line Explosive Hazard (EH) spot report.</p> <p>(a) Line 1, Date-Time Group. Completed this line with the date and time the item was discovered.</p> <p>(b) Line 2, Report Activity and Location. Completed this line with the unit and the 8-digit grid location of the EH.</p> <p>(c) Line 3, Contact Method. Entered the radio frequency, call sign, point of contact (POC), and telephone number.</p> <p>(d) Line 4, Type of Ordnance. Documented whether it was dropped, projected, placed, or thrown or whether it was a possible IED. Gave the number of items, if more than one. Included as detailed of a description as possible of the item in question, to include the size, shape, and physical condition.</p> <p>(e) Line 5, CBRN Contaminations. Be as specific as possible.</p> <p>(f) Line 6, Resources Threatened. Documented equipment, facilities, or other assets that were threatened.</p> <p>(g) Line 7, Impact on Mission. Provided a short description of the current tactical situation and how the EH affected the status of the mission.</p> <p>(h) Line 8, Protective Measures. Documented any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment.</p> | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|---|----|-------|
| <p>(i) Line 9, Recommended Priority. Indicated whether it was immediate, indirect, minor, or no threat. (a) Immediate. Stopped the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical assets vital to the mission. (b) Indirect. Stopped the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical assets important to the mission. (c) Minor. Reduced the unit maneuver and mission capability or threatens noncritical assets. (d) No threat. Had little or no effect on the capabilities or assets of the unit..</p> <p>b. The element "clears" all personnel from the area to a tactically safe position and distance from the potential IED using mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support, time available, civilian considerations (METT-TC) factors.</p> <p>NOTE: The element varies the minimum safe distance (METT-TC dependant) when moving away from the IED to avoid establishing predictability because of possible secondary IEDs. Avoid using any communication or electronic equipment (other jammers/CREW devices) within the previously established and secured exclusion area.</p> <p>c. The element "cordons" off the area, positions jammers/CREW devices to best protect the element, directs personnel out of the danger area, allows entry only to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, and follows existing ROE procedures to question, search, and detain suspects.</p> <p>NOTE: In the event of larger elements, personnel who are deemed nonessential for the purpose of cordoning off the area can either use an alternate route of movement and continue the mission or return to the nearest safe area. Theater-specific guidance or mission necessities may require the unit to react to the IED in a different manner, such as bypassing it.</p> <p>(1) Directed personnel out of the meter minimum danger area.</p> <p>NOTE: Check suspicious personnel exiting the cordoned-off area to suppress the enemy within the danger area.</p> <p>(2) Identified, cleared, and established an area for an incident control point (ICP).</p> <p>(3) Established an ICP for follow-on agencies.</p> <p>(4) Focused Soldiers outward in cordoned positions and the ICP to provide protection and security against command-initiated IEDs and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).</p> <p>(5) Controlled media reporters and reduced civilian distractions.</p> <p>d. The element "checks" the immediate area for secondary devices from the ICP or cordoned positions.</p> | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| <p>DANGER: CONDUCT THESE CHECKS USING THEATER-SPECIFIC METHODS, SUCH AS THE 5/25 METER CHECKS,</p> <p>5-METER CHECK: IDENTIFY A POSITION TO HALT. CARRY OUT A SYSTEMATIC VISUAL CHECK USING BINOCULARS OR OTHER OPTICS. CHECK FOR ABNORMALITIES SUCH AS DISTURBED EARTH, SUSPICIOUS OBJECTS, OR LOOSE BRICKS IN WALLS AND SECURITY TIES. WORK FROM THE GROUND AND CONTINUE ABOVE HEAD HEIGHT. TAKE YOUR TIME, SEARCH METHODICALLY, AND USE A WHITE FLASHLIGHT AT NIGHT.</p> <p>25-METER CHECK: ONCE A 5-METER CHECK IS COMPLETED, CONTINUE VISUALLY CLEARING OUT TO 25 METERS. IF DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE PATROL LEADER, CONDUCT A DISMOUNTED CHECK TO A RADIUS OF 25 METERS AROUND YOUR POSITION, CHECKING FOR POTENTIAL IED INDICATORS AND ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY.</p> <p>DURING THE CONDUCT OF THE 5/25 METER CHECKS THE PATROL MUST REMAIN FOCUSED OUTWARD SEARCHING FROM FAR TO NEAR LOOKING FOR SUSPECTED ENEMY ACTIVITY (SUCH AS A TRIGGERMAN, A CAMERAMAN, OR A SNIPER). THE DRIVER AND THE GUNNER SHOULD REMAIN IN THE VEHICLE.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. The element "controls" the area inside the cordon to ensure only authorized access. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Allowed only authorized emergency vehicles to enter the cordoned area. (2) Ensured that all personnel and vehicles entered and exited the cordoned area through the ICP. (3) Scanned for other enemy indicators such as a cameraman, triggerman, or sniper activity. <p>3. The element properly reacts to a suspected or known IED/VBIED while mounted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Alert the unit of the possible IED/VBIED using the 3 Ds and 5 Cs. b. Conducted surveillance from a safe distance, whenever possible, of both the suspected IED and for a triggerman and did not attempt to move the possible IED. c. Indicated location of suspected IED using unit designated marking system. <p>NOTE: The first vehicle in the patrol to identify the suspected IED attempts to alert other vehicles of the suspected IED location and mark it IAW unit SOP. The nearest vehicle, preferably 100 meters away, from the IED with a radio must transmit the location of the IED to the remainder of the patrol using vehicle internal call signs and indicate the distance and direction of the threat.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. Used available hard cover to the maximum extent. e. Conducted checks of the immediate surroundings to ensure that there were no secondary devices using 5/25 meter checks. f. The element detained a suspected triggerman if one was detected. g. The element calls higher HQ using the 9 line EH spot report. <p>4. React to a possible static IED/VBIED while dismounted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Alert the unit of the possible IED/VBIED using the 3 Ds and 5 Cs. b. Clear the area around the possible IED/VBIED (the minimum safe distance for exposed personnel is 450 meters, dependent on METT-TC factors). c. Establish security, and scan for possible secondary IEDs and signs of enemy activity (such as an impending ambush, a triggerman, a cameraman, or a sniper). d. Report the possible IED/VBIED to the patrol leadership using the EH spot report. e. Follow the patrol leadership directions. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| <p>5. React to a possible SVBIED that is entering a halted unit's perimeter/standoff zone with EOF measures already emplaced.</p> <p>WARNING: SOLDIERS MUST PERFORM THE FOLLOWING STEPS ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT THEATER ROE AND USE THE PROPER EOF MEASURES. REACTION TIME DEPENDS UPON THE VEHICLE SPEED. SOLDIERS MUST BE READY TO SKIP THROUGH THE STEPS IN THE EOF MEASURES BY IMMEDIATELY OPENING FIRE ON THE VEHICLE OR DRIVER IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES.</p> <p>WARNING: THE ENEMY HAS BEEN KNOWN TO USE MULTIPLE SVBIEDS WHEN ATTACKING COALITION FORCES</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Alert unit leadership of the approaching vehicle using the 3 Ds. Signal the approaching vehicle to maintain maximum standoff per unit predetermined distances by using signs, flares, green lasers, spotlights, VS-17 panels, or other clearly visible means. If the vehicle continues approaching, point your weapon at the vehicle and demonstrate intent to use it. If the vehicle continues approaching and becomes an immediate threat, fire aimed warning shots with an appropriate weapon system while taking rounds skipping into consideration. If the vehicle still does not stop, fire aimed shots at the engine block and then the driver (according to ROE and EOF measures) until the vehicle stops. Establish security, and scan for signs of enemy activity (such as additional SVBIEDs, an impending ambush, a triggerman, a cameraman, or a sniper). Report the possible SVBIED and employment of EOF measures to the patrol leadership. Clear the area around the possible SVBIED (the minimum safe distance for exposed personnel is 450 meters, dependent on METT-TC factors). Follow the patrol leadership directions. <p>6. React to a possible PBIED according to current ROE and EOF measures.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Alert the unit to possible PBIED using the 3 Ds, and 5 Cs when applicable. When dealing with a noncompliant suspect, use deadly force according to ROE and EOF measures. <p>DANGER: DURING THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT THE PBIED SUSPECT WILL ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. ENSURE THAT SOLDIERS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO PHYSICALLY RESTRAIN THE SUSPECT. THIS IS VERY DANGEROUS DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF DETONATION BY THE SUSPECT, OR POSSIBLE REMOTE DETONATION.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Issue a verbal command with a loud and firm voice in the local language to maintain maximum standoff until the suspect stops. Your weapon should be at the ready position. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> If the suspect continues to approach, point your weapon at the suspect and show intent to use while continuing to use verbal commands. If the suspect continues approaching and becomes an immediate threat, fire aimed warning shots with the appropriate weapon system, while taking rounds skipping into consideration. If the suspect still does not stop, fire aimed shots until the threat is neutralized (according to ROE). Report the possible PBIED and employment of EOF measures to the patrol leadership. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|---|----|-------|
| <p>(5) Clear the area around the possible PBIED (the minimum safe distance for exposed personnel is 300 meters, dependent on METT-TC factors).</p> <p>(6) Establish security, and scan for signs of enemy activity (such as additional PBIEDs, an impending ambush, a triggerman, a cameraman, or a sniper).</p> <p>(7) Follow the patrol leadership directions.</p> <p>d. When dealing with a compliant suspect-</p> <p>(1) Direct the compliant suspect to show hands, palms up. The suspect must show palms and have fingers spread, so that you can determine if the suspect is palming a detonator (there may be a remote detonator). Visually demonstrate if required.</p> <p>(2) Tell the suspect to place all carried items on the ground and to step two paces away from them. Visually demonstrate if required.</p> <p>(3) Direct the suspect to remove outer clothing, such as jackets, and place the garments on the ground. Maintain cultural sensitivities when dealing with females.</p> <p>(4) Direct the suspect to raise or pull tight any layered clothing while turning in a complete circle in order to reveal any possible concealed devices. Maintain cultural sensitivities when dealing with females.</p> <p>(5) If the suspect cannot be visually cleared, direct the suspect to lie face down with legs spread wide, arms outstretched, and palms up. Do not approach the suspect, even if the suspect is injured.</p> <p>(6) If the suspect cannot be visually cleared, maintain cover.</p> <p>(7) Report the possible PBIED to unit leadership.</p> <p>(8) Clear the area around the possible PBIED (the minimum safe distance for exposed personnel is 300 meters, dependent on METT-TC factors).</p> <p>(9) Establish security, and scan for secondary PBIEDs, along with enemy overwatch positions, for detonating the PBIED.</p> <p>(10) Follow the patrol leadership directions.</p> <p>7. The element avoids establishing a predictable reaction pattern.</p> <p>8. The element conducts a detailed brief and after-action review (AAR) upon completion of operations.</p> | | |

| TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| ITERATION | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | M | TOTAL |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO" | | | | | | | |
| TRAINING STATUS "GO"/"NO-GO" | | | | | | | |

"*" indicates a leader task step.

TASK: Prepare for a Suspected Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)/Person-Borne IED (PBIED) Attack (UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO) (05-2-3092)
(FM 3-19.30) (STP 21-24-SMCT)

ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 M (Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle)

CONDITIONS: The element is conducting operations within a designated area and is given a directive to prepare for a suspected VBIED/SVBIED/PBIED attack. The element has all available equipment, personnel, rules of engagement (ROE), **Escalation of Force (EOF) measure**, a 9-line explosive hazards (EH) spot report, and higher headquarters (HQ) mission instructions. The element personnel have already received a theater-level improvised explosive device (IED)/unexploded ordnance (UXO) briefing. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP4.

TASK STANDARDS: The element prepares for a suspected VBIED/SVBIED/PBIED attack against static positions. The element complies with the ROE, ROI, higher HQ mission instructions, and other special orders. The element takes the necessary actions to minimize injuries or fatalities. The time required to perform this task is increased when conducting it in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4.

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|----|-------|
| <p>* 1. The element leader receives the mission to prepare for a suspected VBIED/SVBIED/PBIED attack and initiates troop-leading procedures. Conducted a mission analysis, which included the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Received and analyzed the order from higher HQ. b. Requested a threat analysis and conducted a local intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). c. Determined specified, implied, and essential tasks. d. Assessed available assets. e. Determined constraints and restraints on the mission. f. Identified critical facts and assumptions. g. Conducted a risk assessment. <p>NOTE: A risk assessment should include the identification of mitigating measures to reduce the risk and evaluate the residual risk after those measures are in place.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> h. Verified the commander's critical information requirements. i. Developed primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communications plans. j. Issued a warning order. k. Reviewed the facts and assumptions. l. Conducted a critical/vulnerability assessment on static positions. m. Constructed a plan and developed a course of action to deter vulnerability. <p>* 2. The element leader briefs the element on known theater-specific threats.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Briefed the element on current enemy VBIED/SVBIED/PBIED capabilities. b. Briefed the element on known enemy Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) and likely locations or placement of previous attacks. c. Briefed the element on current known or suspected indicators, such as— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Out-of-place objects. (2) Unusual activity or abnormal civilian behavior. (3) Unusual bulky clothing. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|---|----|-------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (4) Drivers with any of the following type characteristics: usually are male, ignore orders to stop, attempt to circumvent security, often have a calm demeanor, wear individual ballistic armor (IBA) for protection against small arms fire from coalition forces to ensure that they will be able to carry out the attack, may allow a patrol to come to him (pull over and let a patrol begin to pass), may appear sedated/intoxicated (for example, driving erratically). (5) Absence of normal daily activity. (6) High-speed vehicles. (7) Abandoned vehicles. (8) News crew or cameramen in the area for no apparent reason. (9) Civilians fleeing from the area. (10) Sagging vehicles or those with additional antennas. (11) New tires on a old vehicle or no license plates. (12) Escort by an unusual security detail for the type of vehicle. (13) New welding marks or crudely covered holes or recent painting. (14) Darkened windows. (15) Out-of-place vehicles. <p>3. The element prepares for suspected attacks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ensured proper operations of communications equipment and crypto devices for both mounted and dismounted movement. b. Ensured that personnel protective measures were in place. c. Ensured that all personnel wore protective gear, such as— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) A Kevlar® helmet. (2) Body armor. (3) Eye/hearing protection. (4) Any other mission-essential prescribed personal protective equipment. d. Posted signs on vehicles and checkpoints in the host nation language that warned the local population to remain away from the element and of the authorized use of deadly force. e. Hardened vehicles and protective barriers according to the threat level. <p>4. The element reviews the facility site design. Reviewed the—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Orientation of buildings. b. Relationship of roads. c. Land formations and natural barriers, such as water or vegetation. d. Control points and physical barriers. e. Landscape planting. f. Parking. g. Service access. h. High-speed avenues of approach. i. Site utility vulnerabilities. j. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)/ROE for VBIEDs/SVBIEDs and PBIEDs. <p>5. The element prepares to emplace force protection measures at the identified facility.</p> <p>NOTE: For optimum blast and fragment mitigation, two primary measures should be considered—orientation of the entry control point (ECP) and tactical control point (TCP) to the avenues of approach and reducing the blast effects with suitable barriers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Emplaced barriers to mitigate the blast/fragmentation damage to the facility. b. Ensured that the facility was located at a defensible site, when possible. | | |

| TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES | GO | NO-GO |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| <p>c. Ensured that the facility had crew served weapons that could provide overwatch and effectively cover the site.</p> <p>d. Determined the standoff type and distance by the type and level of the threat, type of construction, and desired level of protection.</p> <p>(1) Maintained as much standoff distance as possible between friendly forces/facilities and possible VBIEDs.</p> <p>(a) Emplaced traffic obstacles near ECPs to slow traffic down.</p> <p>(b) Determined the need for vehicle barriers at facility entries and drives.</p> <p>(c) Offset vehicle entrances from the direction of a vehicle's approach to force a reduction in speed.</p> <p>(d) Determined the need for checkpoints to screen vehicles entering a facility.</p> <p>(e) Positioned gates and perimeter boundary fences outside the blast vulnerability envelope, when possible.</p> <p>(f) Provided a vehicle crash resistance system in the form of a low wall or earth berm, if the threat level warranted.</p> <p>(2) Provided passive vehicle barriers to keep stationary VBIEDs and SVBIEDs at a safe distance from the asset.</p> <p>(a) Used high curbs, low berms, shallow ditches, trees, shrubs, and other physical separations to keep stationary bombs at a distance.</p> <p>(b) Maximized the use of berms to deflect a blast.</p> <p>(c) Prevented vehicles from parking next to perimeter walls of the secured area, (considered using bollards or other devices to keep vehicles away).</p> <p>(3) Maintained security of the Entry Control Point (ECP), Traffic Control Point (TCP) and main avenues of approach.</p> <p>6. The element conducts continuous position improvements until relieved or informed that the threat level has lowered.</p> <p>7. The element conducts a detailed brief and after-action review (AAR) upon completion of operations.</p> | | |

| TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|
| ITERATION | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | M | TOTAL |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO" | | | | | | | |
| TRAINING STATUS "GO"/"NO-GO" | | | | | | | |

“*” indicates a leader task step.